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Finding Facts and Making Judgments
Hon. Jack B. Weinstein ∗
Thank you for this Wigmore Award my friends, and especially
you, Professor Margaret Berger—student, colleague, and mentor—
and for over-honoring me, even at a risk of undermining your own
credibility.
Fifty-five years ago, I was delivered from private practice and deposited on Mount Olympus at Columbia Law School. Almost immediately, because of the untimely death of Professor Jerome Michael, I
was thrown unprepared into the Evidence class, fighting to stay a half
page ahead of my students.
The wonderful multi-volume third edition of Wigmore on Evidence
sat behind my desk. Almost every page had my yellow reminder slip.
It looked like it had developed a fungus infection. Gradually, I
1
pulled a few pages ahead of the students.
Then I was made a judge. After my eight o’clock Evidence class,
I would drive to court with students, warning them on the way that it
was what I said at Columbia—not what I did in court—that counted
on their law school exam. A hearsay objection? Don’t be absurd!
The jury and I wanted to know all we could about these fascinating
2
people and events. And now, with x-ray scans and neurological research revealing how people’s minds work, scientific proof that we’re
all unconsciously biased by reliance on stereotypes (as if we didn’t
know), DNA, genetics, the Internet and e-mail evidence, sophisticated statistical quantifications and probability estimates, Daubert
problems, and other esoteric aspects of our craft, I’m falling further
behind. Fortunately, each year’s new law clerks, who have been
∗

Senior Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
Things have perhaps become a bit easier with the advent of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. See Jack B. Weinstein, Is There Scholarship After Death, or Are Evidence
Teachers Needed After the Federal Rules?, 41 MD. L. REV. 209 (1982).
2
My attempts to legitimize curiosity by abolishing the rules of hearsay ultimately
failed to infiltrate the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force
of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331 (1961).
1
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trained so well by evidence scholars, and the wonderful law review articles I read with such anticipation provide hope for comprehension
of continuing problems of proof.
EVIDENCE’S THIRD DIMENSION—THE NORMATIVE
Evidence teachers have rightly instructed their students that a
trier—whether the judge or jury—is to determine the probability that
facts existed in the real world: evidence is evaluated and then combined in a logical progression of inferences with evidential hypotheses to determine whether propositions of fact (operative facts) required by the rule of substantive law have been established to the
3
requisite degree of probability. Rational fact-finding rules the day.
Much as we try to constrain our judicial inquiry into the facts by
logic in the quiet confines of our courtrooms, we fail, in part for reasons suggested by Carl Sandburg:
“Do you solemnly swear before the ever-living God that the testimony you are about to give in this cause shall be the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth?”
“No, I don’t. I can tell you what I saw and what I heard and I’ll
swear to that by the ever-living God but the more I study about it
the more sure I am that nobody but the ever-living God knows
the whole truth and if you summoned Christ as a witness in this
case what He would tell you would burn your insides with the
pity and the mystery of it.” 4

3
See, e.g., JEROME MICHAEL & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROOF:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE LOGICAL, LEGAL, AND EMPIRICAL ASPECTS OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
(1931); EDMUND M. MORGAN & JOHN M. MAGUIRE, CASES ON EVIDENCE (1934) (a revision of the 1900 second edition of Thayer’s Evidence Casebook); JAMES BRADLEY
THAYER, SELECT CASES ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 1 (1892) (“Reasoning, The
Rational Method of Settling Disputed Questions . . . .”); WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES
OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985); JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., EVIDENCE,
CASES AND MATERIALS 3, 11–14 (9th ed. 1997) (analysis of lines of proof); JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF: OR THE PROCESS OF PROOF AS GIVEN BY
LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY, AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS (2d
ed. 1931); Margaret A. Berger, Science for Judges IX, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 13 (2007) (summary of Science for Judges’ program papers); Jerome Michael & Mortimer J. Adler,
The Trial of an Issue of Fact, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1224, 1462 (1934); D. Michael Risinger,
Introduction, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 835 (2008); Peter Tillers, Visualizing Evidence and
Inference in Legal Settings, 6 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 1 (2007); William Twining, Argumentation, Stories, and Generalizations: A Comment on Prakken et al. “Sense-Making Software,” 6 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 169 (2007).
4
CARL SANDBURG, THE PEOPLE, YES 193 (1936), quoted in Jack B. Weinstein, Some
Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
223, 240 (1966).
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While the difficulties of estimating the probability that an operative fact existed are properly emphasized in our classrooms, less often
stressed is the lack of stability of the law that defines operative facts
and therefore our factual inquiries. Since I shall merely touch on the
point, it is enough to say here that there is a difference between triers’ finding facts and their making judgments about what the substantive law is or should be. The issue is obvious in such matters as
negligence, capital punishment, sex crimes and pornography, gender
discrimination, and punitive damages. Local community views impinge upon—and manipulate—substantive commands, sometimes
with the law’s approval, and sometimes with its disdain, as when we
denominate the process “nullification.” The subtle impact of normative judgments affecting the law in particular cases continues to pervade our trials, arbitrations, and settlements.
In a recent case in my court, the matter was starkly posed when a
middle-aged, otherwise blameless peaceful citizen, who had been terribly sexually abused as a child but created his own supportive family,
was discovered through Internet forensics to be viewing child pornography in a private locked room of his detached garage. The
minimum statutory penalty was five years. After a guilty verdict, the
jury was informed of the mandatory penalty. Jurors then indicated
that they believed the crime warranted treatment rather than incarceration, and that a guilty verdict would probably not have been ren5
dered had they known of the punishment. Of necessity, the resulting opinion, granting a motion to set aside the verdict, deals with an
analysis of colonial juries’ power to decide sentences and impose local
6
community views—the stuff of Booker. Yet the overall trend, led by
the Supreme Court, is reducing the community’s input into rules of
7
law as applied in court by attenuating the jury’s role. Capital cases
and some non-capital sentencing are perhaps exceptions. But, in
fact, biases, community views of equities, and a humane view of life in
all its wonderful and awe-inspiring complexities, still intrude. Triers
make judgments about fairness while they act as factfinders. Do our
students appreciate this fascinating third dimension of Evidence? Do
the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution still guaran5
United States v. Polizzi, __ F. Supp. 2d __, No. 06-CR-22, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26223 (E.D.N.Y. April 1, 2008, revised April 23, 2008).
6
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Colonial history and practice is
also the basis for Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
7
Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of the People, by the People and
for the People, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (see Part VIII, Juries).
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tee the people’s oversight of the courts through juries—the equivalent of voters exercising supervision over the other branches of government? I leave you with these questions that trouble me.

